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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Norman Ortiz-Perez appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty of felony domestic violence in the 
presence of a child, malicious injury to property, and carrying a concealed 
weapon without a permit. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Ortiz-Perez lived with his girlfriend, Megan, their daughter, A.O., and A.G., 
Megan's daughter from a previous relationship. (Trial Tr., p.269, Ls.7-15, p.276, 
L.6 - p.277, L.3.) One evening when Ortiz-Perez and Megan were planning to 
attend Megan's friend's birthday party at the Ranch Club, Megan and Ortiz-Perez 
got in an argument and Megan went to the party without Ortiz-Perez. (Trial Tr., 
p.279, L.9- p.281, L.17.) Ortiz-Perez later confronted Megan at the Ranch Club 
where, in addition to calling Megan names, Ortiz-Perez "backhanded" Megan. 
(Trial Tr., p.287, Ls.5-11, p.420, L.18 - p.421, L.11.) A short time later, Megan 
left the Ranch Club and went to her mother's apartment and went to bed. (Trial 
Tr., p.290, L.9 - p.291, L.11.) 
The following morning, Megan discovered Ortiz-Perez had called her 
numerous times. (Trial Tr., p.298, L.11 - p.299, L.7.) He continued to call her 
and when Megan answered some of the calls, the two continued to argue. (Trial 
Tr., p.299, L.3 - p.300, L.8.) Ortiz-Perez eventually came to Megan's mother's 
apartment and began banging on the door and yelling. (Trial Tr., p.301, Ls.3-19.) 
Megan's mother finally opened the door because her neighbors were outside 
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with their kids. (Trial Tr., p.301, L.22 - p.302, L.7, p.471, L.25 - p.472, L.7.) 
When Ortiz-Perez came in, he pushed Megan's mother aside, and Megan came 
to the bedroom door where she was with her daughters, and saw Ortiz-Perez 
approaching. (Trial Tr., p.302, Ls.4-19, p.472, Ls.18-24.) Ortiz-Perez grabbed 
Megan by the arms and she fell to the ground where Ortiz-Perez proceeded to 
kick her in the face and head while Megan's children stood watching, crying and 
screaming at Ortiz-Perez to stop. (Trial Tr., p.303, L.4 - p.308, L.4.) Ortiz-Perez 
then left and, as he did so, he called Megan names and threatened her. (Trial 
Tr., p.308, L.5 - p.309, L.3.) After leaving, Ortiz-Perez continued to call and 
harass Megan on the phone and when Megan told Ortiz-Perez she was going to 
call the police, he told her she would "pay" and he would "make mention of 
dope." (Trial Tr., p.309, L.13 - p.311, L.3.) 
Although Megan was initially hesitant to call police, in part because she 
was on probation and afraid that Ortiz-Perez would carry through with his threat 
regarding the "dope," she eventually called law enforcement to report the attack. 
(Trial Tr., p.315, L.6 - p.316, L.8.) When Megan later went back to the 
apartment she shared with Ortiz-Perez, she discovered the tires on her car were 
slashed, there was alcohol poured over the hood, the windshield was cracked, 
the dashboard was torn apart, and several CDs and photographs she had inside 
the car were destroyed. (Trial Tr., p.328, L.13 - p.333, L.12; Exhibits 24-35.) 
Inside the apartment, there was additional damage to some pictures, which 
included writing such as "crack whore" and "suck some dick, bitch," torn clothing, 
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and other items that were "destroyed" or taken. (Trial Tr., p.333, L.13 - p.339, 
L.5; Exhibits 36-42.) 
On the way to Megan's apartment in an attempt to locate Ortiz-Perez, law 
enforcement saw Ortiz-Perez driving and initiated a traffic stop. (Trial Tr., p.534, 
L.1 - p.535, L.14.) Officer Jacob Norman asked Ortiz-Perez to exit his vehicle 
and lift his shirt, which exposed a knife attached to Ortiz-Perez's belt loop that 
was removed and collected as evidence after it was determined that Ortiz-Perez 
did not have a concealed weapon permit. (Trial Tr., p.562, L.6 - p.563, L.18, 
p.568, Ls.21-25.) 
When Officer Norman asked Ortiz-Perez about what happened between 
him and Megan, Ortiz-Perez said they had been verbally arguing for two days 
and admitted that he confronted her at the Ranch Club but got "kicked out." 
(Trial Tr., p.569, L.10 - p.571, L.3.) Ortiz-Perez denied causing any injuries to 
Megan and claimed she got them from a fight the night before at the Ranch Club. 
(Trial Tr., p.570, Ls.11-22.) Although Ortiz-Perez originally denied going inside 
Megan's mom's apartment earlier that day, claiming they would not let him in, he 
eventually admitted he went inside for about "two minutes." (Trial Tr., p.573, L.11 
- p.57 4, L.12.) Ortiz-Perez also admitted taking the radio from Megan's car but 
denied slashing her tires. (Trial Tr., p.575, L.9 - p.576, L.1.) 
The state charged Ortiz-Perez with felony domestic violence in the 
presence of a child, malicious injury to property, carrying a concealed weapon 
without a permit, and unlawful entry. (R., pp.31-33.) A jury convicted Ortiz-Perez 
of all charges with the exception of unlawful entry. (R., pp.259-262.) The court 
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imposed a unified 20-year sentence with five years fixed for the felony domestic 
violence charge and concurrent sentences of one-year for malicious injury to 
property and 6 months for carrying a concealed weapon. (R., pp.280-283.) 
Ortiz-Perez filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.290-292.) 
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ISSUES 
Ortiz-Perez states the issues on appeal as: 
1) Did the district court err when it admitted state's exhibit 53, the 
arrest photo of Mr. Ortiz-Perez, over the objection of defense 
counsel, as such testimony was not relevant for the jury's 
consideration? 
2) Did the district court err when it allowed the State to admit 
evidence that Ms. Wardle suspected that Mr. Ortiz-Perez had 
been using drugs, methamphetamine, for several months? 
3) Did the district court err when it allowed a police officer to offer 
hearsay evidence about the non-existence of a concealed 
weapons permit? 
4) Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Ortiz-Perez motion 
for directed verdict on count three, carrying a concealed 
weapon, because insufficient evidence existed to prove the 
material element that Mr. Ortiz-Perez did not have a concealed 
weapons permit? 
5) Under the doctrine of cumulative error, was Mr. Ortiz-Perez's 
right to a fair trial denied as a result of the accumulation of 
serious errors throughout his trial? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Ortiz-Perez failed to show error in the district court's evidentiary 
rulings regarding the admission of Exhibit 53 and Megan's testimony regarding 
Ortiz-Perez's suspected drug use? 
2. Although Ortiz-Perez is entitled to a new trial on the concealed weapon 
charge, is he incorrect in his assertion that he is entitled to an acquittal? 
3. Has Ortiz-Perez failed to establish he is entitled to relief based on 
cumulative error? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Ortiz-Perez Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Evidentiary 
Rulings Regarding Exhibit 53 And Megan's Testimony About Ortiz-Perez's 
Suspected Drug Use 
A Introduction 
Ortiz-Perez claims error in the district court's evidentiary rulings relating to 
(1) the admission of Exhibit 53, a photo taken of Ortiz-Perez on the date of his 
arrest, and (2) testimony regarding Megan's suspicion that Ortiz-Perez was using 
drugs, which was part of an ongoing conflict between them. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.6-12.) Application of the correct legal standards to Ortiz-Perez's evidentiary 
claims shows he has failed to meet his burden of showing error. 
8. Standard Of Review 
"The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion." 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (citations omitted). 
When the appellate court reviews an evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion, it 
considers (1) whether the trial court perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent 
with any applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court exercised 
reason in reaching its decision. State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919, 921, 216 P.3d 
1291, 1293 (Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). 
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C. Ortiz-Perez Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Exhibit 53, 
The Photo Taken The Day Of His Arrest 
During Officer Norman's testimony, the state introduced Exhibit 53, which 
is a photo taken of Ortiz-Perez on the date of his arrest. (Trial Tr., p.577, Ls.7-
14.) When the state moved for its admission, Ortiz-Perez objected based on 
relevance and noted "he's been identified by every witness that he is Norman 
Ortiz-Perez." (Trial Tr., p.577, Ls.19-24.) The state responded: "Your Honor, he 
looks a little bit differently today than he did at the time. He has been identified 
by the witnesses, but I think that the jurors will be able to see what he looked like 
that day as well." (Trial Tr., p.578, Ls.2-6.) The court admitted the photo "for that 
limited purpose." (Trial Tr., p.578, Ls.7-8.) 
On appeal, Ortiz-Perez claims that while a "mugshot" may be appropriate 
where identification is an issue, such an issue did not exist in this case and, 
therefore, the picture was irrelevant. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Ortiz-Perez has 
failed to establish error in relation to the admission of Exhibit 53. 
In State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 921, 655 P.2d 434, 438 (1981) the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated: "Photographs showing the contemporaneous 
scene of a crime or appearance of a person are generally admissible in the 
discretion of the trial court, unless the photograph is so inflammatory that its 
probative value is outweighed by the prejudice which might result from its 
inflammatory nature." (Emphasis added.) While it is true, as Ortiz-Perez noted 
at trial, that the previous witnesses identified him in court, it was entirely 
appropriate for Officer Norman to also identify him as the individual he arrested 
and nothing prohibited him from doing that using a photograph in addition to an 
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in-court identification, particularly since the record indicates Ortiz-Perez "look[ed] 
a little bit different[ ]" at trial and, unlike other witnesses who identified Ortiz-
Perez and knew him personally, Officer Norman did not. Furthermore, Ortiz-
Perez's only objection was based on relevance; he made no assertion that the 
photograph was inflammatory or otherwise prejudicial. (See Trial Tr., p.577, 
Ls.21-24.) Ortiz-Perez's contrary claim, made for the first time on appeal, that 
admission of the photo was admitted "in an attempt to bias the jury against [him]," 
is not preserved and should not be considered by this Court. State v. 
Vondenkamp. 141 Idaho 878, 885, 119 P.3d 653, 660 (Ct. App. 2005) (citations 
omitted) ("An objection on one ground will not preserve a separate and different 
basis for excluding the evidence."). Even if considered, there is nothing 
prejudicial about the photograph. It only depicts Ortiz-Perez's face and is entirely 
unremarkable. (Exhibit 53.) 
Even if the court erred in allowing introduction of Exhibit 53, such error 
was harmless. "An error is harmless if the reviewing court is able to declare 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict." State 
v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269, ---, 270 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 219-220, 245 P.3d 961, 971-972 (2010)). The 
admission of Exhibit 53, if error, was harmless for the same reason Ortiz-Perez 
claims it was irrelevant - the jury was fully aware that Ortiz-Perez had been 
identified was Megan's assailant and was arrested by Officer Morgan. Moreover, 
although the record does not reflect how Ortiz-Perez "look[ed] a little bit 
different[]" at trial, there is nothing apparently prejudicial in Exhibit 53 and this 
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Court should not presume error based on any discrepancy in Ortiz-Perez's 
appearance absent evidence that any difference between Ortiz-Perez's trial 
appearance and how he appeared in Exhibit 53 injected prejudice, particularly 
given the lack of any objection on this basis. This Court can easily conclude, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury's view of a photograph of Ortiz-Perez 
on the day of his arrest did not contribute to the verdicts finding him guilty of 
felony domestic violence in the presence of a child, malicious injury to property, 
and carrying a concealed weapon without a permit. Indeed, given that the jury 
acquitted Ortiz-Perez of unlawful entry, it is highly unlikely the photograph had 
any impact on the jury's deliberations regarding guilt. 
Ortiz-Perez has failed to show error in the admission of Exhibit 53 and 
even if this Court concludes otherwise, the error is harmless. 
D. Megan's Testimony About One Of The Sources Of Conflict Between Her 
And Ortiz-Perez Was Relevant To Rebut Any Implication That She Lied 
About Ortiz-Perez's Abuse Because He Was Unfaithful And To Explain 
Her Delay In Reporting Due To Ortiz-Perez's Threats That He Would 
"Make Mention Of Dope" If She Called Police 
The theme of Ortiz-Perez's opening statement was that Megan is a liar. 
(Trial Tr., pp.266-268.) Later, during cross-examination of Megan, Ortiz-Perez 
explored whether Megan was upset with Ortiz-Perez for being unfaithful to her, 
implying that would be a motive to lie about the battery: 
Q: You testified yesterday that he is accusing you of cheating on 
him; right? 
A: Pretty much, yes. 
Q: And you thought he was cheating on you; right? 
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A: No. 
Q: With Rana Castro? 
A: Not just that night. 
Q: Okay. Well, what do you mean not just that night? 
A: It had -- that was not actually the topic of conversation really 
directly that night. 
Q: But that had been an issue between the two of you, hadn't it? 
A: That day or -- I'm not sure what you're asking me? 
Q: Right. Because he had been dating Rana Castro when the two 
of you got together; correct? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Objection, relevance. 
THE COURT: I don't want you to go down this very far because 
the relevance is somewhat tenuous. So tie it up. 
A: ... Is that true? 
A: I'm sorry. What was your question? 
Q: [Ortiz-Perez] was dating Rana Castro when you and [Ortiz-
Perez] got together? 
A: He was splitting up with her. 
Q: Okay. And then there were concerns that he was getting back 
together with her and that's why the issue kept coming up; correct? 
A: No. 
Q: So you weren't -- you weren't concerned that he was cheating 
on you? 
A: That's not what you just asked me. 
Q: Were you concerned that he was cheating on you? 
A: I don't know about concerned, but I was pretty much under the 
impression that he was. 
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Q: Right. You were mad about that? 
A: I was mad about him lying. 
(Trial Tr., p.394, L.13 - p.396, L.4.) 
Shortly after this exchange, the prosecutor advised the court, outside the 
presence of the jury that it was her position that Ortiz-Perez "opened the door" to 
testimony from Megan about Ortiz-Perez's drug use. Specifically, the prosecutor 
argued: 
... [D]efense went into [Megan] being upset with the defendant for 
cheating with a particular person. One the officer's audio from the 
beginning she says -- I mean, she and he both say that they're 
fighting about these accusations of each other cheating on one 
another. But she also tells the officer that he's doing other things to 
jeopardize the relationship. And the officer says, like what? And 
she says, drug activity. And he's like, what do you mean by that? 
And she's like, you know, selling, using, that that also put her 
probation in jeopardy and they had been fighting about that 
because she said when she met him he was doing that stuff, but he 
got clean and things were better. And then he started doing it 
again and she felt it was jeopardizing her probation and they had 
been arguing about that as well. 
I think counsel's opened the door for me to be allowed to 
inquire about that as well to show that her motivation isn't to back 
stab or get back at him for him supposedly sleeping with another 
woman. It's the combination of all of these things that they've been 
fighting about and ended up in her saying, I'm going without you to 
this party tonight, and, then, of course, the aftermath. 
(Trial Tr., p.399, L.11 - p.400, L.12; see also p.405, L.6 - p.406, L.18.) 
The court agreed, reasoning: 
Based on what I've heard at this point, and it starts really with the 
opening statement as well as this cross examination where, as 
[defense counsel] says, this is all about her credibility. Therefore, 
the state is going to be allowed to - both to bring in evidence that 
shows that she, in fact, is credible. That includes the evidence that 
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he threatened to put dope on her and that he - it's not being offered 
for the truth of the matter. It goes to her state of mind. 
In particular the state in their motion in limine said that if the 
defense basically raises the time delay, which clearly the defense 
has, that they should be allowed to bring in evidence that she was 
hesitant to call the police because she was on felony probation and 
that the defendant had threatened to put dope on her. 
Now, in addition, I find that what that does is that it also 
opens the door to the evidence -- two really important pieces of 
evidence. One of those is his statement to the police that, in fact, 
he had dope in the van. Whether it's true or not is really not the 
relevant issue. It's the fact that he's saying he has dope. It is -- it 
goes to her credibility on whether he was threatening her with 
putting dope on her to get her probation violated. 
So I'm going to let that in at this point and you can certainly 
explore the fact that they never found any. But that's really not the 
point. It's clearly an admission on his part and goes really to her 
reasoning behind not reporting this. 
In addition, the taped - the taped phone call, I think I 
previously ruled that that could come in, but to me at this point it 
makes it very clear that it's appropriate for it to come in because it 
definitely goes to her credibility because in this telephone call to 
Rana Castro, as I understand what the state has told me, he tells 
Rana Castro to tell Megan Wardle that he was really high, jealous 
and mad. That's why he did what he did. These are clear 
admissions and they go to her state of mind in all of this. So I'm 
going to allow all of that in. 
(Trial Tr., p.407, L.23 - p.409, L.17.) The court also expressly weighed the 
probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice and 
concluded the "probative value it has is not substantially outweighed by any 
unfair prejudice to the defendant." (Trial Tr., p.410, Ls.4-7.) 
On redirect, consistent with the court's ruling, Megan testified that she and 
Ortiz-Perez were fighting about issues other than fidelity; namely, her belief that 
Ortiz-Perez was "using" methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., p.416, Ls.13-24.) Megan 
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testified that her suspicions about his drug use were an ongoing point of 
contention because such behavior could jeopardize her probation and her 
sobriety. (Trial Tr., p.417, Ls.3-20.) Megan further explained that she was 
hesitant to report Ortiz-Perez's abuse to law enforcement because Ortiz-Perez 
"more or less ... threaten[ed] to pin dope on [her] when he knew ... that's the 
nature of her [charge] and that's what [she was] on probation for" and she 
believed Ortiz-Perez would "pin dope" on her if she called the police. (Trial Tr., 
p.428, Ls.2-19.) 
On appeal, Ortiz-Perez appears to assert the admission of Megan's 
testimony regarding Ortiz-Perez's suspected drug use was improper character 
evidence in violation of I.R.E. 404(b). (Appellant's Brief, pp.10.11.) This was not, 
however, the basis of Ortiz-Perez's objection before the trial court. Rather, when 
the court considered the prosecutor's argument that Ortiz-Perez opened the door 
to evidence that he and Megan were also fighting about his suspected drug use, 
defense counsel responded by arguing his belief that he did not open the door 
and that, in any event, the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. (Trial Tr., p.403, L.7 
- p.404, L.2.) These objections, based on I.R.E. 401 and 403, are insufficient to 
preserve an objection under I.R.E. 404. 1 Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho at 885, 119 
1 Although there were other I.R.E. 404(b) issues raised at trial, it does not appear 
they were related to Megan's belief that Ortiz-Perez was using 
methamphetamine. (See~. R., pp.183-185 (motion in limine regarding Ortiz-
Perez's statements to officer that he had "dope" in the van, his statements in a 
recorded jail call to Rana Castro about being "really high and jealous and mad," 
and his threat to Megan that he would "put dope on her"); Trial Tr., pp.46-47 
(Ortiz-Perez's "prior incidents with the prior women"); Tr., pp.47-52 (Ortiz-Perez's 
threatening phone messages to Megan).) While the threat to "pin dope" on 
Megan was referenced in the state's "Motion in Limine - 404(b) Notice," filed 
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P.3d 653, 660 (Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted) ("An objection on one ground 
will not preserve a separate and different basis for excluding the evidence."). 
As to whether Megan's testimony on this point was relevant, the district 
court correctly concluded the evidence was relevant to Megan's credibility. Such 
evidence was particularly relevant in light of Ortiz-Perez's defense that Megan 
was a "liar" and sustained her injuries during an alleged fight at the Ranch Club. 
See State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 285 P.3d 348, 355 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Proof 
of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher 
of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might 
bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness' testimony.") (citation omitted). The 
district court also properly weighed the probative value of the evidence against 
the danger of unfair prejudice, and Ortiz-Perez has failed to establish the district 
court abused its discretion in this regard. 
Even if the district court erred in allowing Megan to testify about her 
suspicions, any error was harm.less given the weight of the evidence establishing 
Ortiz-Perez battered Megan, including the eyewitness testimony of her daughter 
and mother, was carrying a concealed weapon, as observed by Officer Norman, 
and destroyed Megan's property, which defense counsel essentially conceded in 
his opening statement. (Trial Tr., p.268, Ls.7-11.) Furthermore, the court 
August 2, 2011, it was not the subject of the motion. Rather, it was referred to in 
relation to the state's request to admit Ortiz-Perez's statement to Officer Norman 
at the time of his arrest that he had "dope" in the van. (R., pp.183-84.) The state 
also submits that Ortiz-Perez's generalized "Objection to Proposed 404(b) 
Evidence," filed June 9, 2011 (R., p.104), is insufficient to preserve an objection 
any 404(b) issue that may arise; validating such an objection would be contrary 
to the requirement of specific objections and would deprive a district court of a 
fair opportunity to evaluate an objection at an appropriate time. 
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provided a limiting instruction advising the jury that evidence "showing that the 
defendant committed wrongs or acts other than that for which the defendant is on 
trial" was only to be considered for the "limited purpose of proving the 
defendant's opportunity, intent, or plan," which in this case would be his 
opportunity and threat to "pin dope" on Megan in order to prevent her from 
reporting his illegal conduct. (R., p.253.) 
Ortiz-Perez has failed to show error in the court's evidentiary ruling 
regarding Megan's testimony. Alternatively, any error in the admission of the 
testimony was harmless. 
11. 
Although Ortiz-Perez Is Entitled To A New Trial On The Concealed Weapon 
Charge, He Is Not Entitled To An Acquittal On That Charge 
A. Introduction 
Ortiz-Perez raises two issues on his appeal that relate to his concealed 
weapon conviction. Ortiz-Perez contends the district court erred in denying his 
motion for an acquittal because, he argues, the evidence was insufficient to 
support a conviction for that offense. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-21.) Ortiz-Perez 
also contends, in an entirely separate argument, that the district court erred in 
overruling his hearsay objection to the evidence presented on the element of 
whether he had a concealed weapon permit. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-19.) 
Although Ortiz-Perez has failed to establish error in the denial of his 
motion for an acquittal on the concealed weapon charge, he is entitled to a new 
trial on this charge because the district court erred in overruling his hearsay 
objection and the error was not harmless. 
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B. The District Court Did Not Err In Denying Ortiz-Perez's Rule 29 Motion 
Because There Was Substantial Evidence From Which The Jury Could 
Find, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That Ortiz-Perez Did Not Have A 
License To Carry A Concealed Weapon 
At the close of evidence, Ortiz-Perez moved for a judgment of acquittal on 
the concealed weapon charge, arguing the state failed to "prove the non-
existence of carrying a concealed weapon [sic]."2 (Trial Tr., p.663, L.16 - p.664, 
L.2.) The court denied the motion, explaining: 
... I'm going to find there is sufficient evidence for which --
from which a jury could infer that there is, in fact, no 
concealed weapons license. The officer, in fact, testified that 
it is part of his routine when they run someone to get all of 
the information including whether they have a concealed 
weapons permit and that there -- they do maintain that and 
then he is told. In this case he was not told that Mr. Ortiz-
Perez had a concealed weapons permit. And, therefore, I 
find that's sufficient for a jury to infer that, in fact, that 
element has been proven. 
(Trial Tr., p.666, Ls.5-17.) 
Ortiz-Perez asserts the district court erred in denying his request for an 
acquittal, claiming "it cannot be said that substantial evidence was elicited to 
support [his] conviction for concealing a dangerous weapon" since the only 
evidence presented was that "dispatch did not tell Officer Norman that Mr. Ortiz-
Perez possessed a concealed weapons permit." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) 
Contrary to Ortiz-Perez's assertion, the district court correctly concluded the 
evidence elicited on this point was sufficient to support a finding, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that Ortiz-Perez did not have a permit. 
2 Presumably, Ortiz-Perez meant the non-existence of a concealed weapon 
permit, which is how the court interpreted his argument. 
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Ortiz-Perez moved for an acquittal pursuant to I.C.R. 29, which provides, 
in relevant part that a court "shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal ... if 
the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction." I.C.R. 29(a). In support of 
his request, Ortiz-Perez cited State v. Morales, 129 Idaho 951, 908 P.2d 1258 
(Ct. App. 1996). In Morales, the Court of Appeals held that "the State bears the 
burden of proving that a person charged with violation I.C. § 18-3302(7) or (9), is 
not licensed to carry a concealed weapon." 127 Idaho at 954, 908 P.2d at 161. 
In this case, the state charged Ortiz-Perez with violating I.C. § 18-3302(7) (R., 
p.31), and the jury was instructed, as required by Morales, that it must find Ortiz-
Perez "did not have a license to carry a concealed weapon" (R., p.249). 
Application of the correct legal standards shows the state satisfied its burden of 
proving this element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
"Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope." State 
v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, _, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011). An appellate 
court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if 
there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller, 
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 
Idaho 570, 826 P .2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review the appellate 
court will not substitute its view for that of the jury (or judge) as to the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State 
v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991). Moreover, the facts, 
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and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding 
the jury's (or judge's) verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. 
Hart, 112 Idaho 759,761,735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). 
On direct exam, Officer Norman testified that if an individual has a 
concealed weapon permit, that information will be provided to an officer when the 
officer runs a "driver's license check" and "criminal history check." (Trial Tr., 
p.566, Ls.14-20.) When asked whether he requested this information in Ortiz-
Perez's case, Officer Norman testified that "one of [his] assist officers did." (Trial 
Tr., p.567, Ls.15-17.) Officer Norman testified that "dispatch did not make us 
aware -- or did not tell us that [Ortiz-Perez] had a valid concealed weapons 
permit." (Trial Tr., p.568, Ls.1-3.) Officer Norman's testimony in this regard was 
sufficient to prove that Ortiz-Perez was not licensed to carry a concealed weapon 
given his related testimony that, had such a permit existed, dispatch would have 
notified them. Ortiz-Perez's claim that this evidence was insufficient fails. 
C. The State Concedes Ortiz-Perez Is Entitled To A New Trial On The 
Concealed Weapon Charge 
After Officer Norman testified that "[o]ne of [his] assist officers" ran the 
records check with dispatch, the prosecutor asked: "And did you become aware 
of whether or not the defendant had a weapon - or a permit to carry a concealed 
weapon?" (Trial Tr., p.567, Ls.15-20.) Ortiz-Perez objected based on hearsay. 
(Trial Tr., p.567, Ls.21-22.) The prosecutor responded: "I think it comes in under 
[I.RE. 803(7)]." (Trial Tr., p.567, Ls.23-24.) The court overruled the objection 
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without comment after which Officer Norman testified that dispatch did not advise 
that Ortiz-Perez had a valid permit. (Trial Tr., p.567, L.23 - p.568, L.3.) 
Ortiz-Perez argues Officer Norman's testimony that Ortiz-Perez did not 
have a valid permit was "hearsay within hearsay, prohibited by I.R.E. 805." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Ortiz-Perez also contends that I.R.E. 803(7) is 
inapplicable. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-19.) The state concedes error in the 
admission of Officer Norman's testimony and that the error was not harmless. 
Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted." I.R.E. 801 (c). Hearsay is not admissible unless an exception 
applies. I.R.E. 802. To the extent there is "[h]earsay included within hearsay," in 
order to be admissible, there must be an exception for "each part of the 
combined statements." I.R.E. 805. 
Officer Norman's testimony regarding the existence of a valid permit was 
based upon what his assist officer told him based on what dispatch told the assist 
officer and both statements were for the purpose of establishing the truth of the 
matter asserted, i.e., that Ortiz-Perez did not have a valid permit. Thus, the 
testimony involved two separate hearsay statements - the assist officer's 
statement to Officer Norman and dispatch's statement to the assist officer. The 
state is unaware of any exception that would allow Officer Norman to testify 
about what his assist officer told him with respect to Ortiz-Perez's permit status. 
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As such, the testimony was inadmissible, 3 and the state concedes it cannot 
establish the error was harmless since it was the only evidence offered on an 
element of the concealed weapon charge. Accordingly, Ortiz-Perez is entitled to 
a new trial on this charge.4 
111. 
Ortiz-Perez Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error 
"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there 
is 'an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, 
but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention 
of the defendant's constitutional right to due process." State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 
576, _, 261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and alteration omitted). 
A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding 
of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 
1998). In addition, cumulative error analysis does not include errors neither 
objected to nor found fundamental. Perry. 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P .3d at 982. 
3 Because there is no exception that would allow for admission of this portion of 
Officer Norman's testimony, the Court need not address whether I.R.E. 803(7) 
would apply to dispatch's statement to the assist officer. 
4 The state's concession on this point does not change the sufficiency of the 
evidence analysis because review of the sufficiency of the evidence includes 
consideration of all evidence presented to the jury regardless of whether an 
appellate court later decides the evidence was inadmissible. State v. Moore, 148 
Idaho 887, 893-94, 231 P.3d 532, 538-39 (Ct. App. 2010). The proper remedy 
for the erroneous admission of hearsay in a trial is a new trial, not an acquittal. 
ti, State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 224 P.3d 485 (2009). 
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Although there was error in relation to Officer Norman's testimony 
regarding the concealed weapon charge, Ortiz-Perez has failed to show any 
other error. As such, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Ortiz-Perez's 
convictions for felony domestic violence in the presence of a child and malicious 
injury to property and vacate his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon 
without a permit and remand for a new trial on that charge. 
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